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CLASS AND ETHNIC CONFLICT IN INDONESIA'S DECOLONIZATION 
PROCESS: A STUDY OF EAST SUMATRA
Michael van Langenberg
This article examines the class and ethnic conflicts that characterized the later 
stage of the Indonesian National Revolution in a region with a particularly complex 
social composition--the former Residency of East Sumatra. It focuses in particular 
on the forces that made possible the establishment (with Dutch support) of an 
"autonomous” state in East Sumatra, the so-called Negara Sumatera Timur (NST), 
which lasted from December 1947 to August 1950. It also suggests that the way in 
which these forces were mobilized and articulated politically contributed signifi­
cantly to the state's eventual demise, and left behind deep antagonisms which con­
tinue to affect the region's politics today.
The original "mass" base for the NST had been produced out of the enormous 
structural changes resulting from Dutch colonial rule between 1870 and 1942. Three 
ethnolinguistic groups in East Sumatra--Malays, Simalungun and Karo--quite con­
sciously viewed themselves as the indigenous inhabitants (orang asli) of the region. 
The Malays and Simalungun particularly felt themselves threatened by the flood of 
immigrants--Javanese, Chinese, Toba Batak, and others--which had poured into 
the area since the development there of a vast plantation economy from the end of 
the nineteenth century. At the same time, these orang asli were divided among 
themselves, insofar as the Malays had, since the advent of colonial rule, been politi­
cally dominant, and expected to maintain that dominance within the NST.
Superimposed on these interests, and crosscutting them to some extent, were 
those of the "traditional" local aristocracies (often termed the kerajaan) , 1 through 
whom the Dutch ruled, and who, in many cases, had derived vast wealth from the 
plantation economy. In sometimes uneasy alliance with these aristocracies were im­
portant elements of the former Netherlands Indies colonial Establishment, both 
Dutch and "native."
In a period of revolutionary upheaval, the kerajaan (especially the Malay kera­
jaan) attempted to defend their class and ethnic interests by mobilizing support 
from their fellow "ethnics," promoting the NST as a bulwark for the defense of 
ethnic interests. Political exclusion of the immigrant communities, however, served 
to deepen their identification with the revolutionary Republic, and led eventually-- 
when the Dutch finally withdrew at the end of 1949--to the rapid collapse of the 
NST and the extinction of the kerajaan as a political force. In the process, the 
interests of the ethnic Malays were most adversely affected, leaving powerful
1. Kerajaan--a  Malay term literally meaning "being in the state of having a raja." 
See Anthony Crothers Milner, "The Malay Raja: A Study of Malay Political Culture 
in East Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula in the Early Nineteenth Century" (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Cornell University, 1977), p. 17. In the following analysis a distinc­
tion is made between the kerajaan as a "class" of hereditary aristocrats and the 
ruling families of the East Coast "native states," i . e . , the sultans and raja.
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3residues of ethnic resentment which have not ceased to leave their mark on the 
political life of "East Sumatra."
The Colonial Pattern
Between 1870 and 1942 the territories and populations of some forty-one princi­
palities located on the northern and central east coast of Sumatra, comprising three 
main ethnic communities--Malay, Karo Batak, and Simalungun Batak--were incor­
porated into the Netherlands East Indies empire. Contractual agreements were en­
tered into between local rulers and the Indies government, whereby the principali­
ties (reduced in number from forty-one to thirty-four) were granted nominal status 
as "self-governing [native] states" (zelfbesturende landschappen) , given fixed 
territorial boundaries, and eventually linked together as the Residency of Sumatra's 
East Coast.2 The Malay, Karo, and Simalungun Batak communities were together 
granted recognition by the new colonial authorities as the "native" population of 
the residency, with special rights to land ( tanah) and preeminence in customary 
law (adat). 3
While the "traditional," precolonial polities and social institutions were being 
incorporated within the colonial system, those same seventy-odd years saw the dem­
ographic, cultural and class patterns of East Sumatran society change markedly. 4
2. The forty-one principalities consisted of:
A. The five Malay sultanates of Langkat, Deli, Serdang, Asahan,and Siak.
B. Twenty-four smaller Malay principalities, namely: Indrapura; Tanah Datar; 
Pasisir; Limapuluh; Sukudua; Kualuh; Bilah; Panai; Kotapinang; Pelalawan; 
Bedagai; Padang; the five Rokan states of Tambusai, Kepenuhan, Rambah, 
Kuntuh Dar Es Salaam, and Rokan Empat; the two Kampar Kiri states of 
Rantau and Sengingi; and the five Deli urung of Hamparan Perak, Sunggal, 
Sukapiring, Senembah, and Percut.
C. The five Karo sibayak of Kutabuluh, Lingga, Sarinembah, Suka, and 
Barusjahe.
D. The seven Simalungun "kingdoms" of Silimakuta, Dolok Silau, Purba, Raya, 
Pane, Siantar, and Tanah Jawa.
Under the contractual agreements the five Deli urung plus Bedagai and Padang 
were all made part of the Deli sultanate, reducing the number of "self-governing" 
states within the residency to thirty-four.
On the "self-governing" status of the principalities and the contracts, see 
Anthony Reid, The Blood of the People: Revolution and the End of Traditional Rule 
in Northern Sumatra (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 46-56; 
William Joseph O'Malley, "Indonesia in the Great Depression: A Study of East Suma­
tra and Jogjakarta in the 1930's" (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1977), 
pp. 109-26; Madahi, Sedikit "Sejarah Perkembangan Hak Hak Suku Melayu Atas 
Tanah di Sumatera Timur" (Tahun 1800-1975) (Jakarta: Badan Pembinaan Hukum 
Nasional, 1978), pp. 30 f f .;  H. Mohammad Said, Suatu Zaman Celap di Deli. Koeli 
Kontrak Tempo Doeloe Dengan Derita dan Kemarahannya (Medan: Waspada, 1977), 
pp. 23-54; W. H. M. Schadee, Ceschiedenis van Sumatra's Oostkust (Amsterdam: 
Oostkust van Sumatra Instituut, 1918), vol. 1; and Michael van Langenberg, "North 
Sumatra under Dutch Colonial Rule: Aspects of Structural Change" (Part One) in 
Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs, 11, 1 (January-June, 1977), pp. 74-110; 
and (Part Two) in ib id ., 11, 2 (July-December, 1977), pp. 45-86.
3. On these special rights, see Mahadi, Sedikit; and Reid, Blood, ch. 3.
4. On the changes outlined below, see Reid, Blood, ch. 3; Said, Suatu Zaman; 
O'Malley, "Indonesia," ch. 3; Thee Kian-wie, Plantation Agriculture and Export
4By 1930, for example, the large-scale immigration of Chinese, Javanese, and other 
ethnic groups, from other parts of Sumatra and beyond, into the booming planta­
tion-based economy of the Residency had reduced the orang asli to a minority of 
the population. 5 A new, westernized town and plantation-based elite had replaced 
the previous "feudalistic," rural elites of the precolonial principalities. This new 
colonial Establishment, made up of two tiers or levels--the European planters, 
businessmen, and government officials at the top and below them the orang asli 
aristocracies, the western-educated Indonesian professionals (doctors, lawyers, 
senior civil servants, e t c .) , and the wealthier Chinese and Indian merchants-- 
collectively encompassed markedly different interests and articulated different 
social values from its predecessors. Only the orang asli aristocracies provided any 
sort of continuity with the precolonial past, while at the same time constituting an 
anachronism within the strongly "modernist” present which this Establishment as a 
whole represented.
The Declaration of Independence
On August 17, 1945 Indonesian national independence was proclaimed in Jakar­
ta. More than a month later, on September 30, the independence declaration was 
repeated at a rally of young nationalists in Medan, the capital of the East Coast 
Residency. But support for this declaration of independence among the East Suma­
tra aristocracies was conspicuous by its absence. The Malay sultans, datuk and 
tengku, the Simalungun raja, and many of the Karo sibayak and raja were clearly 
anticipating the return of the Dutch to help restore pre-War "normalcy." As a 
result, tension between these aristocracies, or kerajaan, and the more militant sec­
tors of the Indonesian nationalist movement (the pergerakan) increased rapidly, and 
the lines between them became ever more sharply drawn. 6 The Malay sultans, in
Growth: An Economic History of East Sumatra, 1863-1942 (Jakarta: National Insti­
tute of Economic and Social Research, 1977); Michael van Langenberg, "North Suma­
tra 1942-1945: The Onset of a National Revolution," in Southeast Asia under Japa­
nese Occupation, ed. Alfred W. McCoy, Monograph Series no. 22 (New Haven:
Yale Southeast Asian Studies, 1980), pp. 33-45; and "North Sumatra under Dutch 
Rule," Parts One and Two; Karl J. Pelzer, Planter and Peasant: Colonial Policy and 
the Agrarian Struggle in East Sumatra 1863-1947 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1978).
5. The Indonesian ("native") population of East Sumatra in 1930 totaled 1,470,395, 
of which Malays accounted for only 22.77 percent, Karo Batak 9.89 percent, and 
Simalungun Batak 6.47 percent. Thus the three orang asli ethnic groups were a 
minority of 39.13 percent. The largest single ethnic group in the Residency was 
the Javanese who made up 40.11 percent of the total Indonesian population. The 
orang asli had also been reduced to minorities in the sultanates of Deli, Langkat, 
Serdang, and Asahan, in four of the smaller Malay states (Sukudua, Limapuluh, 
Kotapinang, and Bila), and in three of the Simalungun "kingdoms" (Tanah Jawa, 
Siantar, and Pane). See Volkstelling 1930 (Batavia: Departement van Economische 
Zaken, 1935), Part IV. Pelzer, Planter, p. 63, gives the ethnic Malay population 
of East Sumatra in 1930 as only 15 percent of the total Indonesian population of the 
region. However, this figure seems at variance with the percentages given on 
page 167 of the census (above).
6. On the development of the Indonesian nationalist movement in East Sumatra, 
and its antipathy towards the kerajaan, see Reid, Blood, pp. 38 f f . ;  Said, Suatu 
Zaman, pp. 113 f f . ;  O'Malley, "Indonesia"; Hamka, Kenang-kenangan Hidup (Kuala 
Lumpur: Pustaka Antara, 1966); Julia Niblett, "The Development of Nationalist 
Activity 1926-1931: An East Sumatra Case Study" (B.A. thesis, University of Syd-
5particular, had long been notorious for their wealth, extravagant life-styles, arro­
gance, and economic mismanagement. 7 The kerajaan as a whole were determined to 
defend the interests of both their class and their ethnic groups against what they 
saw as a new, expansionist, Javanese-dominated Indonesian state. The pergerakan, 
on the other hand, were equally determined that what for them was a feudal, col­
laborationist elite had to be removed if Indonesia's national independence was to be 
defended effectively against Dutch attempts to restore their colonial hegemony.
In March 1946 these tensions finally exploded into open violence. Throughout 
most of the twenty-five "native states" 8 armed pergerakan groups went on the 
attack. Many aristocrats were killed and hundreds arrested. The kingdoms and 
native states were declared abolished. Land was nationalized in the name of the 
Republic of Indonesia. All special class, ethnic, and communal land rights were 
abrogated. For the pergerakan militants this was the start of a "Social Revolution" 
essential if East Sumatra was to be freed from colonial overlordship and to join the 
larger Indonesian National Revolution. The besieged kerajaan and their supporters, 
on the other hand, saw themselves as victims of "terrorist" violence unleashed by 
"Communist" extremists for the sole purpose of seizing land, personal property, 
and political power from the hands of the lawful owners of property and the legiti­
mate holders of power. Although the basic cleavage was between kerajaan and per­
gerakan, subsidiary ethnic, religious, and ideological antagonisms divided both 
sides, making the Social Revolution an enormously complex and chaotic phenomenon.9
Without coherent leadership or clear-cut long-term objectives, the Social Revo­
lution quickly lost momentum and petered out by mid-1946.10 During the next
ney, 1978); Karen Entwistle, "The 'Pergerakan' Movement in East Sumatra 1938- 
1942" (B.A. thesis, University of Sydney, 1979); and Michael van Langenberg, 
"National Revolution in North Sumatra: Sumatera Timur and Tapanuli 1942-1950" 
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of Sydney, 1976), pp. 118-425.
7. See Reid, Blood, pp. 50-53.
8. During the Japanese occupation Siak, Pelalawan, the five Rokan states, and the 
two Kampar Kiri states had been removed from the territorial jurisdiction of the 
East Coast Residency, leaving only twenty-five "native states" within the Resi­
dency's boundaries. It is these twenty-five states with which this article is con­
cerned. See Map 1.
9. For accounts of developments in East Sumatra from the start of the Japanese 
occupation in 1942 until the outbreak of the Social Revolution, see Anthony Reid, 
"The Japanese Occupation and Rival Indonesian Elites: Northern Sumatra in 1942," 
Journal of Asian Studies, 35, 1 (November 1975), pp. 49-61; "The Birth of the 
Republic in Sumatra," Indonesia, 12 (October 1971), pp. 21-46; and Blood, passim; 
Anthony Reid and Shiraishi Saya (ed s .), "Rural Unrest in Sumatra, 1942: A Japa­
nese Report," Indonesia, 21 (April 1976), pp. 115-33; Mohammad Said, "What was 
the 'Social Revolution of 1946' in East Sumatra?" Indonesia, 15 (April 1973), pp. 
145-86; Hamka, Kenang-kenangan; Tengku Lukman Sinar, "The East Coast of Suma­
tra under the Japanese Heel," Sumatra Research Bulletin, 1, 2 (May 1972), pp. 
29-43; PRIMA [Pejuang Republik Indonesia Medan Area], Biro Sejarah, Medan Area 
Mengisi Proklamasi. Perjuangan Kemerdekaan dalam Wilayah Sumatera Utara (Medan: 
Badan Musyawarah PRIMA, 1976), vol. 1, passim; van Langenberg, "National" and 
"North Sumatra 1942-1945."
10. For detailed accounts and analyses of the events of the Social Revolution, see 
Reid, Blood, pp. 185 f f .;  Said, "What was the 'Social Revolution'"; PRIMA, Medan; 
and van Langenberg, "National," pp. 426-87.
6twelve months, as both the local pergerakan and the larger Indonesian nationalist 
movement were forced increasingly onto the defensive under pressure from first 
British, and then Dutch, military forces, the kerajaan elite moved to regain its lost 
power and resources. With Dutch sponsorship and protection a political movement 
for the establishment of an "autonomous” East Sumatra state took shape. The con­
cerns most overtly represented within this movement were: the position of the 
"traditional" hereditary aristocracies; the maintenance of an economy based upon 
the pre-War structure of large-scale plantation production financed by a high level 
of foreign capital investment; protection of the special land rights of the orang 
asli; and the predominance of an emphatically Malay "national" culture.11
Special Region Autonomy
Since April 1946 those leaders of the East Sumatra kerajaan who had survived 
the Social Revolution had beset the Dutch authorities in Medan, Jakarta, and Hol­
land with accounts of the sufferings of the orang asli at the hands of Republican 
"extremists" and with continual affirmations of loyalty to the Dutch crown. They 
demanded that the Netherlands government intervene in East Sumatra to restore 
"law and order" and the "customary rights" of the orang asli.12 By early 1947 the 
Dutch authorities were responding favorably to these entreaties.13 14
Most of the East Sumatra kerajaan and the overwhelming majority of the Malay, 
Chinese, and Eurasian communities in East Sumatra deliberately placed their futures 
in the hands of the Dutch. By April 1947 that future was taking shape in the form 
of plans being jointly constructed by the Dutch and the kerajaan to restore pre- 
War economic "prosperity" and political "stability" to the region through the estab­
lishment of an orang asli (and especially Malay)-controlled East Sumatra state, pro­
tected by Dutch arms and living off a revived plantation economy. 1*t
11. A more detailed narrative of the events outlined in this article, from the estab­
lishment of the East Sumatra state movement until the eventual collapse of the state 
itself in August 1950, is given in my "National," pp. 488 ff.
12. See letter from Rapolsum [Regeeringsadviseur voor Politieke Zaken op Sumatra] 
Medan to Lt. Gouverneur-Generaal, Batavia, No. 453/Z.G., December 1, 1947 
(Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague [hereafter referred to as ARA]).
13. Letter from Directeur Nefis, Batavia to Lt. Gouverneur-Generaal, Batavia, 
April 2, 1946; Letter from Tengku Abdoellah Hod Dewa Sjachdan of Langkat to 
Minister van Overzeesche Gebiedsdeelen, The Hague, May 5, 1946 (Archives of the 
former Ministerie van Kolonien held in the Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, The 
Hague [hereafter referred to as B Z]); Letter from Gouverneur, Chief C.O. NIC A 
Sumatra, Medan (AMACAB), to Lt. Gouverneur-Generaal, Batavia, June 16, 1946 
(BZ); Memorandum from Nefis, Singapore, to Directeur Nefis, Batavia, November 
16, 1946 (BZ); Letters from Consulaat-Generaal der Nederlanden, Singapore, to 
Directeur Nefis, Batavia, January 15, 1947, March 18 and 20, 1947 (BZ); and Memo­
randum from Directeur-Generaal Algemeene Zaken, Batavia, to Lt. Gouverneur- 
Generaal, Batavia, April 1, 1947 (BZ).
14. See: Letter from Rapolsum, Medan, to Lt. Gouverneur-Generaal, Batavia, No. 
27/Geh., April 26, 1947 (BZ); Memorandum from Directeur-Generaal Algemeene 
Zaken, Batavia, to Lt. Gouverneur-Generaal, Batavia, No. 882/Geh., April 10,
1947 (BZ); Nefis, Medan, "Politiek en Economisch overzicht van Noord-Sumatra 
16-31 Mei 1947" (BZ), p. 1; and Recomba [Regeeringscommissaris voor Bestuurs- 
aangelegenheden--Government Commissioner for Administrative Affairs], Medan, 
"Rapport van den Recomba voor Noord-Sumatra over Augustus 1947" (ARA), p. 2.
7Paradoxically, however, these plans sought to avoid the restoration of the sul­
tans and raja to their pre-War political positions. Both the Dutch and more West­
ernized sector of the kerajaan regarded the former rulers as obstacles to a modern 
future, above all as impediments to the appearance of ’’democracy" which the plan­
ners were keen to maintain in any future East Sumatra state.15 Nevertheless, the 
traditional rulers were not entirely dispensible. The Malay sultans, in particular, 
continued to symbolize fundamental values underlying the proposed state, namely a 
self-conscious Malay ethnic identity.16 Even if their pre-War power had declined, 
they still remained functionally important to their communities and were able to act 
in defense of their own interests. Early in 1947 the Sultan of Deli, then in Holland 
to press his case for Dutch intervention to restore "stability" in East Sumatra, ex­
pressed these values succinctly:
I shall certainly return to Deli, when that will be I am not certain. The posi­
tion of the Sultan of Deli is No. 2 of my aspirations, No. 1 is and remains 
"ALAM MELAJOE" (the Malay World), a Malay territory reorganized and 
democratized, but based on Malay Adat, free from the Republic of Indonesia. 
Following my discussions in Holland I have reason to hold fast to this ideal.
I shall do my best, God protect the Malays. I shall now work in this direc­
tion, I am not optimistic, I only do my duty as a Malay Nationalist, the ulti­
mate result lies in God's hands.17
On the morning of July 21, 1947 Dutch military forces in East Sumatra moved 
out of their Medan Area enclave and launched a major coordinated offensive against 
the Republican-controlled regions in the Residency. By August 8, they had occu­
pied the entire region between the Serangan river to the north and the Asahan 
river to the south.18 The Dutch forces then halted in response to the ceasefire 
order issued by the United Nations Security Council. In the course of their opera­
tions Dutch troops freed hundreds who had been interned since the Social Revolu­
tion in March 1946, including the sultans of Langkat, Serdang, and Asahan, the 
Simalungun raja of Siantar and Tanah Jawa, dozens of members of the Malay, Karo, 
and Simalungun kerajaan, and many former senior colonial civil servants.
Barely ten days after the start of the Dutch military offensive, and before the 
Dutch occupation of most of the Residency had been completed, a mass meeting took 
place in Medan to demand the establishment of an autonomous East Sumatra state. 
Speakers at the meeting attacked the leaders of the Republic of Indonesia for
15. Letters from Rapolsum, Medan, to Lt. Gouverneur-Generaal, Batavia, No. 27/ 
Geh., April 26, 1947 and No. 44/Geh., May 24, 1947(BZ); Memorandum from Lt. 
Gouverneur-Generaal, Batavia, to Directeur Kabinet and Directeur-Generaal Alge- 
meene Zaken, Batavia, June 10, 1947 (BZ); Letter from Gouvernements Secretaris, 
Batavia, to Consul-Generaal der Nederlanden, Singapore, No. 1662, June 12, 1947 
(BZ). See also Reid, Blood, pp. 52 and 261.
16. The concept of kerajaan indicates the importance of the ruler to Malay ideas of 
a polity, and the centrality of the ruler to Malay cultural identity. The ruler is the 
symbolic personification of the community's values and historical traditions. See 
Milner, "Malay," ch. 7.
17. Letter from Sultan of Deli to his secretary in Singapore, appended to letter 
from Consulaat-Generaal der Nederlanden, Singapore, to Directeur Nefis, Batavia, 
January 15, 1947 (BZ). Emphases added.
18. See Map 2. On the Dutch military offensive in East Sumatra, part of the first 
so-called "Police Action" against the Republic, see van Langenberg, "National," 
pp. 577-80.
8having sanctioned murder and pillage during and after the Social Revolution and 
called for the setting up of an autonomous East Sumatran Special Region (Daerah 
Istimewa Sumatera Timur). The chairman read out a petition on behalf of the orang 
asli communities, calling on the Netherlands Indies government to recognize East 
Sumatra as an autonomous state within an independent federal Indonesia, in accor­
dance with the terms of the recently concluded Iinggajati Agreement.19 The meet­
ing concluded with the formation of a Committee for an East Sumatra Special Region 
(Comite Daerah Istimewa Sumatera Timur--Comite DIST), headed by a prominent 
kerajaan member of the Medan Establishment, Tengku Dr. Mansoer.20 In the next 
few days similar mass meetings were held in several other towns, notably in Binjei 
(Langkat), Lubuk Pakam (Serdang), and Pematang Siantar (Simalungun). 21 These 
meetings marked the beginnings of the final stage in plans for setting up an East 
Sumatra state. When the Dutch military action ended on August 8, this final stage 
was well under way. 22
19. On the Iinggajati agreement, see Anthony Reid, The Indonesian National Revo­
lution 1945-1950 (Hawthorn: Longman Australia, 1974), pp. 96 and 109-12; and 
Charles Wolf, J r ., The Indonesian Story (New York: John Day, 1948), pp. 175-78.
20. Mansoer (1897-1955) was an uncle of Sultan Saiboen of Asahan. He had re­
ceived his medical training at the medical school for natives (STOVIA) in Batavia 
where from 1917 to 1919 he had been the founding president of the quasi-nationalist 
student organization Jong Sumatra. He then went to Leiden for further medical 
studies, and there married a Dutch woman. After returning to Medan he estab­
lished a considerable reputation as a surgeon and writer of medical texts. In the 
late 1930s he was active in establishing an East Sumatra Association (Persatuan 
Sumatera Timur--PST) which aimed at promoting the educational and material de­
velopment of the orang asli peoples. In 1940 he became its chairman. In March 
1945 he was made chairman of the Japanese-established advisory council (shu sangi- 
kai) for the East Sumatra Residency. On the prewar PST, see Reid, Blood, pp. 
68-70. The other members of the Comite DIST were: Tengku Hafas (Malay), Tengku 
Mr.Dzulkarnain (Malay), Datuk Hafiz Haberham (Malay), Djomat Purba (Simalungun), 
Raja Sembiring Meliala (Karo), Tengku M. Bahar (Malay), Mr. Djaidin Purba (Sima­
lungun) , Raja Silimakuta (Simalungun), Madja Purba (Simalungun), Anak Raja Pane 
(Simalungun), Raja Kaliamsjah Sinaga (Simalungun), and Orang Kaya Ramli (Malay). 
Indonesia, Kementerian Penerangan, Republik Indonesia: Propinsi Sumatera Utara 
(Jakarta, 1954?), p. 216 (hereafter referred to as Propinsi). Also on the estab­
lishment of the Comite DIST, see Medan Bulletin, August 1, 1947; Badan Penerangan 
Negara Soematera Timoer, Negara Soematera Timoer Sepintas Laloe (Medan, 1948),
p. 8; Oostkust van Sumatra Instituut, Kroniek, 1947, p. 36 [hereafter referred to 
as Kroniek] . All the members of the Comite were of unmistakably kerajaan and 
Establishment origins.
21. Propinsi, p. 216; Negara Soematera Timoer Sepintas Laloe, p. 9; and Recomba 
Medan, "Rapport van den Recomba voor Noord-Sumatra over Augustus 1947" (ARA), 
pp. 3-4.
22. Two days after the Comite DIST rally in Medan the Recomba for North Sumatra 
noted that while the East Sumatra state movement was still mostly limited to the 
kerajaan and the ethnic Malay sector of the population, some support for it was 
being mobilized by Simalungun leaders around Pematang Siantar. He added, how­
ever, that with the emergence of the movement, coupled with the release from in­
ternment of the sultans of Langkat and Asahan and the impending return to Medan 
of the Sultan of Deli, the "problem" of the restoration of the traditional kingdoms 
"will immediately come to the fore." Letter from Recomba, Medan to Lt. Gouver- 
neur-Generaal, Batavia, No. 405/P.Z., August 2, 1947 (BZ).
9Formulating a Program
With the success of Dutch arms few among the supporters of the Comite DIST 
would have disagreed in principle about the most important and immediate tasks 
ahead. As a propaganda booklet published some two years after the East Sumatra 
state had been established declared: "Once East Sumatra had been purged of irre­
sponsible groups, as a result of the Netherlands Army's police action in July 1947, 
this entire region had to be reconstructed from scratch."23 The basic goal was a 
polity "purged" of Indonesian nationalist elements, and with institutions and values 
once again firmly rooted in tradition (notwithstanding the concepts of "moderniza­
tion" to which some sections of the DIST movement were seriously committed). The 
consensus was for a state firmly under control of orang asli (particularly Malay) 
elites to guarantee the maintenance of traditional orang asli rights and privileges; 
this state would preserve a profitable relationship with foreign capital via the plan­
tation economy, and would defend its territorial integrity through a close alliance 
with Dutch arms.
A semblance of an orang asli communal and cultural identity had already emerged 
in East Sumatra prior to the Japanese occupation, despite differences resulting from 
conflicting class, ethnic, and religious interests. It was a consciousness of being 
"sons of the soil," a nascent East Sumatran "nationalism" in the face of the large 
immigrant population that had grown up in the residency since the 1870s.2"* These 
sentiments now took organized political form in opposition to the Republic of Indone­
sia, which was seen, in the light of its overwhelming support from the Javanese 
and Toba Batak ethnic communities, to be acting deliberately in support of non- 
orang asli interests. 25
Once the UN-negotiated ceasefire had come into effect on August 8, 1947,
Dutch officials in Medan, in conjunction with the Comite DIST leaders, immediately 
began setting up a non-Republican bureaucracy. Netherlands Indies officials, all 
Dutchmen, were made district heads (Assistant Residents) for Langkat, Deli, Ser- 
dang, Asahan, Simalungun, and Karoland, with the specific task of establishing 
and operating new regional administrations. 26 Prominent local Comite DIST sup­
porters were made mayors of the three largest cities in the Residency--Medan, 
Pematang Siantar, and Tebingtinggi. 27 Two senior Indies civil servants became 
permanent advisors to the Comite DIST.28
On August 25, 1947 members of the Comite DIST, other prominent supporters 
of the East Sumatra state movement, and senior Dutch officials met at the home of 
Dr. Mansoer in Medan to discuss the basic conditions under which the proposed 
state would be established. The Dutch officials, concerned with international
23. Djabatan Penerangan Negara Sumatera Timur, Bukti (Medan, 1949), p. 10.
24. See van Langenberg, "North Sumatra under Dutch Rule" (Part Two), pp.
75-76.
25. This ethnic support for the Republic is examined in van Langenberg, "Nation­
al," passim.
26. Recomba, Medan, "Verslag betreffende de politieke en economisehe toestand 
van het bezetgebied van de Oostkust van Sumatra. Afgestloten op ultimo September 
1947" (BZ), p. 1.
27. Waspada (Medan), September 8, 1947.
28. These two men, G. J. Forch and G. van Gelder, had previously been senior 
officials o f the Netherlands military intelligence service in Medan.
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opinion, were insistent that the state be "democratic" to the extent that all vestiges 
of "feudalism," i . e . , residual powers remaining in the hands of the hereditary 
rulers, would have to be abolished, and all possible popular support be cultivated 
and represented. 29
Most of the Comite DIST, including Mansoer, accepted Dutch proposals for the 
virtual disbanding of the traditional kingdoms. Since the Social Revolution,they 
were only too aware of the strength of anti-kerajaan feeling amongst large sections 
of the East Sumatra population, including even the Simalungun and Karo orang 
asli communities.30 As the senior Indies government official in East Sumatra noted 
in September 1947:
The Simalungun Bataks, Tobas and Karo Bataks, who will struggle by word 
and deed for a more or less democratic polity, will certainly withdraw [from 
the East Sumatran state movement] if they get the impression that they have 
been fitted before the cart of the coastal Malay sultans, for whom they hold 
not a grain of sympathy, particularly not for the Sultan of D eli.31
But "democracy," or broadening the popular base of the proposed state, had its 
limits. The Comite DIST leaders were uninterested in "democracy" if this involved 
any watering down of the principle of orang asli, and particularly Malay, dominance.
As a result of agreement between the Dutch and DIST leaders at the August 25 
meeting, the size of the Comite was increased both to broaden its ethnic composi­
tion and reduce its kerajaan flavor. The nine new members included representa­
tives of the Toba Batak, Chinese, and East Indonesian (Menadonese, Ambonese, 
and Timorese) communities. But since three of the Simalungun kerajaan members 
of the initial Comite withdrew while four additional Malay members were appointed, 
the new Comite ended up being even more Malay-dominated than its predecessor.32
29. On August 11 the Lt. Governor-General, Hubertus van Mook, noted that the 
future of the traditional royal families in East Sumatra would have to await further 
developments, as it was still unclear if they would be able to play any active part 
in a modernized political structure in the Residency. He suggested that, in view of 
this, priority should be given to educating younger members of the royal families 
so that they would be able to gather popular support as leaders beyond the narrow 
confines of their respective traditional kingdoms. At the same time, van Mook in­
formed the brother of the Sultan of Langkat that restoration of the East Sumatra 
sultanates would only be effected under "modernized" conditions. Memorandum 
from Lt. Gouverneur-Generaal, Batavia, to Procureur-Generaal, Batavia, August 
11, 1947 (ARA).
30. See Reid, Blood, pp. 218 f f .; and van Langenberg, "National," pp. 426 ff.
31. Letter from Recomba, Medan, to Lt. Gouverneur-Generaal, Batavia, No. 136/ 
Geh., September 13, 1947 (BZ). Three days later he remarked that any attempt 
to incorporate the traditional Malay kingdoms within an East Sumatra state would 
only serve to create "problems" in Simalungun and Tanah Karo. See Letter from 
Recomba, Medan, to Lt. Gouverneur-Generaal, Batavia No. 699/P.Z., September 
16, 1947 (ARA).
32. Apart from the four Malays, the additional members of the Comite were made up 
of three Toba Batak, two Chinese and one Menadonese, one Ambonese and one 
Timorese. These twelve new members were: Florencius Lumbantobing (Toba), Dr. 
F. J. Nainggolan (Toba), H. F. Sitompul (Toba), Tan Boen Djin (Chinese), Tan 
Wee Beng (Chinese), M. Lalisang (Menadonese), C. B. M. Manusiwa (Ambonese),
A. H. F. Rotty (Timorese), Abdul Wahab (Malay), Sajoeti (Malay), Mohamad Noeh 
(Malay), and Datuk Kamil (Malay). Thus in the new twenty-two member Comite
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The expanded Comite also did not include even one representative of the largest 
single ethnic group in the Residency--the Javanese. The three Toba Batak repre­
sentatives, moreover, were all from a very small group of Toba intellectuals who, 
because of their obvious preferences for speaking Dutch and for a conspicuously 
Western life-style, had been victims of pergerakan radicalism during and after the 
Social Revolution. As a result, they had become deeply alienated from the Indone­
sian Republic. These people in no way reflected popular Toba support for the 
proposed East Sumatra state. On the contrary, at the mass level, ethnic conflict 
between the orang asli and the Toba Batak communities in East Sumatra was by now 
intense.33 34 Likewise, the absence of Javanese representation accurately reflected 
the almost complete lack of popular support among the Javanese for the DIST move­
ment. 3<*
Among the Chinese in East Sumatra, however, support for DIST increased dur­
ing August 1947, as a direct result of the continuing attacks by remnants of Repub­
lican armed groups still operating in the Residency.35 Most Chinese in East Suma­
tra were by now eager to see the setting up of the East Sumatran state under Dutch 
military protection, with its promise of a return to the security and prosperity of 
pre-War days. In return, Comite DIST leaders supported demands by Chinese 
community leaders that the Chinese security force, the Poh An Tui, be strength­
ened. 36 Notwithstanding anti-Chinese sentiments which many Comite DIST and 
orang asli community leaders may have held privately, they recognized the crucial 
importance of the Chinese-controlled sector of the regional economy to the state 
being envisaged by the DIST planners.
Indeed, the rehabilitation of the plantation economy quickly came to occupy 
most of the attention of the Dutch administrations in Medan and Jakarta, and of 
the Comite DIST. All parties realized that the viability of the East Sumatra state 
would depend on the revival of the plantation economy. As for the plantation
there were fourteen orang asli representatives (ten Malay, three Simalungun, and 
one Karo). Regeerings Voorlichtingsdienst, Batavia, Relaas No. 1201, October 8, 
1947, "Oostkust van Sumatra" (ARA), p. 4.
33. See letter from Rapolsum, Medan, to Lt. Gouverneur-Generaal, Batavia, No. 
453/Z.G., December 1, 1947 (ARA).
34. At the end of September 1947, Dr. Mansoer, at a meeting with Lt. Governor- 
General van Mook in Medan, is alleged to have admitted that the Comite had not 
been able to induce any prominent Javanese in East Sumatra to join it. See Pro- 
pfnsi, p. 218. This virtually total lack of Javanese support for the Comite DIST 
has been confirmed by a number of informants with reason to have been sympa­
thetic to one or other side of the kerajaan-pergerakan conflict.
35. Such attacks were frequently reported in the Chinese press at the time. See 
translations of such reports during August 1947 in Nefis, Batavia, "Chinese Pers 
(N .E.I. ) ," No. 68/1947 (BZ).
36. The Poh An Tui had been established at the beginning of 1946 by the Allied 
military command in Medan, as a local volunteer Chinese security force responsible 
for maintaining order in the Chinese sectors of the city. By September 1947 its 
strength had reached about 1,000, made up of fifteen regional units in Langkat, 
Deli, Serdang, Simalungun, and Tanah Karo. It had by then become virtually an 
ancillary arm of the Dutch military forces in the Residency. See letter from Terri­
torial tevens Troepen-commandant "Z" Brigade, Medan, to Commandant van het 
Leger, Batavia, No. 5563/THO/NI/U, September 16, 1947 (Archives of the Minis- 
terie van Defensie, The Hague).
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companies, they wanted to return their investments to profitability as quickly as 
possible.
By the second half of September 1947, as discussions between the Comite DIST 
and the Indies authorities proceeded, restoration of the plantation economy became 
integral to questions about the overall political future of the region. Most of the 
foreign estate companies had either reopened their offices, or had established 
representatives, in Medan. The two pre-War planters' associations, AVROS and 
DPV, were once again functioning and busy with plans for reopening the planta­
tions. 37 By November, regular discussions had begun between the Indies govern­
ment, the Comite DIST, AVROS, and the DPV on the question of plantation re­
habilitation, in particular the problem of how the squatting ladang (dry rice) 
farmers were to be removed.38
If rehabilitation of the plantation economy was a central issue to the DIST 
movement, so too was the future of the former native states and the position of 
their ruling families. The initial acceptance by the Comite DIST of Dutch insistence 
on a "de-feudalized" East Sumatran state soon produced a major split in the ranks 
of the DIST movement, expressed by the establishment of two rival political parties: 
one representing the more modernist, antifeudal position taken by the Comite DIST 
leadership, the other representing those more concerned with the preservation of 
traditions and the pre-War status quo.
The former, the Party of the Special Region of East Sumatra (Partai Daerah 
Istimewa Sumatera Timur--Pardist) was sponsored and led by members of the 
Comite DIST. 39 The party's first public announcement declared that:
"PARDIST" has been formed out of the secret associations "S .S ." (Siap 
Sedia) and "P .S .T ." (Persatuan Sumatera Timur) which have been active 
since the Japanese Army occupied Indonesia. . . .
At the time of the Japanese surrender and the establishment of the Republic 
of Indonesia, the aims and purposes which we have already experienced to­
gether, when the majority of us experienced the acts of tyranny, these se­
cret associations, which had at first disbanded, were reactivated in order 
to free our compatriots and those of the East Sumatra people who since that 
time had been held in internment by the Republic of Indonesia, even though
37. Recomba, Medan , "Verslag betreffende de politieke en economische toestand 
van het bezetgebied van de Oostkust van Sumatra. Afgesloten op ultimo Septem­
ber 1947" (BZ), pp. 3 and 9; "Kort verslag van de vergadering van het Bestuur 
der AVROS te Medan," September 9, 1947 (BZ). The DPV (Deli Planters Vereeni- 
ging--Deli Planters'Association) had been established in 1879 as an association of 
tobacco planters. AVROS (Algemene Vereeniging van der Rubberplanters ter Oost­
kust van Sumatra--General Association of the East Coast of Sumatra Rubber Plant­
ers) was established in 1910.
38. "Samenvatting van het verhandelde op de vergadering gehouden op . . .  13 
November 1947 . . . in de Landschapsvergaderzaal Soekamoelia, Medan"; Letter 
from Voorzitter van de AVROS, Medan, to Recomba voor Sumatra's Oostkust, 
November 24, 1947. On the increase in squatter cultivation of plantation lands 
since the 1930s, see van Langenberg, "National," pp. 118 ff.
39. Dr. Mansoer became Patron of Pardist. Datuk Hafiz Haberham, the Pardist 
First Chairman, was also a member of the Comite DIST. Altogether nine members 
of the Comite were on the Pardist leadership council. With the eventual establish­
ment of the East Sumatra state in 1948 the party changed its name to Partai Negara 
Sumatera Timur--Parnest.
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the Republic o f Indonesia itself had been unable to prove them guilty of 
any offense. . . .
These secret associations have played their part in speeding up the long 
desired release of these Republican prisoners, in cooperation with the 
Netherlands Army. . . .
"PARDIST" is a party of the PEOPLE. All inhabitants irrespective of 
descent, religion or ethnicity, may become members of the party.
"PARDIST" firmly and resolutely opposes the reestablishment of the gov­
ernment of the Republic of Indonesia in East Sumatra.
"PARDIST" supports the KOMITE Daerah Istimewa Soematera Timoer which 
has now been formed from leaders from the above two secret associations.
"PARDIST" is willing to become the kernel of the KOMITE Daerah Istimewa 
Soematera Timoer.1,0
The second party, calling itself the National Party of East Sumatra (Partai 
Nasional Sumatera Timur--PNST), was formed in Medan on September 8 by a group 
of Malay kerajaan (mostly related to the royal families of Deli, Langkat, and Ser- 
dang). Many had been interned during the Social Revolution. A "History" and a 
"Statement of Principles" of the PNST, issued by the party at the end of Septem­
ber, clearly expresses the perceptions and ideals that flowed from the recent ex­
periences of most of those actively engaged in the East Sumatra state movement:
In March 1946 leaders of the Republic o f Indonesia together with their fol­
lowers organized a movement which they called the Social Revolution. . . . 
they seized governmental power, killed, kidnapped, robbed, raped, and 
carried out other illegal actions against thousands of people from all ethnic 
groups, a large proportion of whom were the Native Inhabitants of East 
Sumatra [Boemipoetera Soematera Timoer] from all strata (men, women, and 
children). . . .  this movement had been organized for the purpose of seizing 
our motherland East Sumatra by destroying the power of our people, killing 
those who held power (those who governed)--those who had become leaders 
in accordance with the customary law--interning the intellectuals, impover­
ishing our people, dividing other ethnic groups from our own and making 
false allegations of feudalism. . . .
Because of this . . .  we would quickly establish an association [serikat] 
which would have as its aims:
a. to unite the natives of East Sumatra within a single party so that, al­
though not a large [ethnic] group, they will not vanish within the 
society at large;
b. to create consciousness o f our customs and traditions and the special 
privileges consonant with the times;
c. to press for positions of responsibility for its members;
d. to withdraw East Sumatra from the Republic.1+1 401
40. Pardist, Medan, "Partai Daerah Istimewa Soematera Timoer (Pardist) telah Ben- 
toek," September 27, 1947 (ARA).
41. Riwajat Partai Nasional Soematera Timoer Didirikan, appended to letter from 
Pengoeroes Besar PNST, Medan, to Lt. Gouverneur-Generaal, No. 120, October 1, 
1947 (ARA).
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The party’s "Statement of Principles" took a strong anti-Java line, while stress­
ing the desire for close economic and cultural ties with Holland and for the creation 
of an independent Sumatran state within an eventual Indonesian federation. 42
The differences between the two parties were quite apparent. Pardist, as the 
political child of the Comite DIST, was formed to articulate and mobilize popular 
support for the ideals of an East Sumatra state in the form agreed upon between 
the Comite and the Dutch authorities. As such, it consciously avoided emphasizing 
the ideals of Malay and kerajaan hegemony promoted by the hardliners in the PNST.43 4
The PNST had come into being as a result of fears (justifiable in the circumstances) 
among the Malay royal families that both the Dutch and the Comite DIST had already 
decided upon their political extinction. The sponsors and leaders of the PNST were 
determined to restore and preserve the pre-War rights and privileges of the Malay 
ruling families, if necessary in direct political opposition to the Comite DIST. ^
In stressing the differences between the two parties one should not overlook 
the fundamental values they represented in common. Both reflected a strong Malay/ 
orang asli consciousness. Pardist may have sought to deny any ethnic coloring, 
but the interests it represented were quite clearly those of the orang asli. It may 
not have been as raucously Malay-centered as the PNST, yet the party leadership 
was clearly Malay-dominated. Moreover, bitter memories of the Social Revolution 
of 1946 loomed just as large in the public statements of Pardist leaders as they did 
in those of the PNST.
Dutch concern to minimize kerajaan influence in the Comite DIST, and in any 
future East Sumatran state, featured prominently in discussions between the Comite 
and a high-level Indies government delegation, led by Lieutenant Governor- 
General van Mook, held in Medan on September 30. Mansoer, on behalf of the 
Comite, supported this Dutch concern, pointing out that even though the Comite 
included many members of the traditional ruling families:
Here there has been a Social Revolution. Here the Sultans do not possess 
de facto powers. The Comite is not against the traditional rulers, but it 
is intended to make perfectly clear the basic democratic nature of this re­
gion. . . . We do not oppose the traditional rulers. But today we believe 
it to be both unnecessary and dangerous for us to include representatives 
of the Sultans on the Comite. 45
The discussions concluded, on October 3, with agreement on the basic struc­
ture for an autonomous East Sumatran state to be established within a federal state
42. Beginsel-Programma Dari Partai Nasional Soematera Timoer, appended to ibid.
43. See Reid, Blood, p. 261.
44. Memorandum from Lt. Gouverneur-Generaal, Batavia, to Directeur Kabinet, 
Batavia, No. 3346/AgSU, October 4, 1947 (ARA). Two days after the formation of 
the PNST the Sultan of Deli requested, on behalf of the traditional rulers, that the 
Indies government clarify just what the future position of the rulers would be and 
whether the government was prepared to abide by the terms of the pre-War "long 
contracts" with the Malay rulers. See letter from Rapolsum, Medan, to HVK, Bata­
via, No. 120/Z.G., December 18, 1948 (ARA). The PNST subsequently split into 
"hard" and "soft"-line factions. The latter, a minority, argued that protection of 
the traditional kingdoms should not mean a restoration of "feudalism." See Recomba, 
Medan, "Verslag betreffende de politieke en economische toestand in de Negara 
Soematera Timoer over de maand Maart 1948" (ARA), p. 3.
45. Cited in Propinsi, pp. 218-19.
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of Indonesia. 46 The agreement firmly excluded the traditional rulers from positions 
of any political consequence in the proposed state by virtue of hereditary rights 
alone. 4* Five days later a decree of the Lt. Governor-General of the Indies pro­
vided for a further enlarged Comite DIST to become a Provisional Representative 
Council (Dewan Sementara), pending the final establishment of the autonomous 
state. As for the traditional kingdoms, a decision on their future status was de­
ferred. In the meantime all their residual powers would be exercised jointly by 
the Netherlands Indies administration and the Dewan Sementara. 48
The decree brought immediate reaction. The Sultan of Langkat proposed to 
the Lt. Governor-General:
Custom and tradition can only be made strong again in this region if the 
traditional kingdoms in East Sumatra are themselves made strong once 
again, because they are the pillars of the adat here. . . .
In my opinion the governmental structure most suitable for East Sumatra 
is: for all the [traditional] self-governing kingdoms in East Sumatra to be 
joined into a federation. . . .
Decisions of the [legislative] council would have to be approved by the 
abovementioned federation of rulers and they would be implemented in each 
kingdom in the name of the ruler of that particular kingdom.
Therefore, I am of the opinion that the decisions of such a people’s Council 
must firstly be filtered through a council of traditional rulers because I 
know that the people of this country are insufficiently educated to consider 
fully the consequences of a law or the effects of its implementation. 49
It was a vain plea for a cause already effectively lost. Given the glare of interna­
tional attention then being focused upon their actions in Indonesia, the Dutch were 
disinclined to commit their limited resources to the support of such patently "colo­
nialist" institutions as the pre-War native states of East Sumatra.
In the meantime, the Dewan Sementara was formed with eighteen members from 
the Comite DIST plus ten new members, including representatives for the Javanese, 
Dutch, Eurasian, and Indian communities. All members of the new Dewan were 
appointed specifically as representatives of particular ethnic/racial communities. 
However, with three Dutch representatives to just one Javanese, the changes were
46. Recomba, Medan, "Verslagbetreffende de politieke en economische toestand 
van het bezetgebied van de Oostkust van Sumatra over de maand October 1947" 
(BZ), p. 1. On the development of Dutch plans for a federal Indonesian state after 
the Japanese surrender, see A. Arthur Schiller, The Formation of Federal Indone­
sia (The Hague: van Hoeve, 1955), pp. 18-25.
47. The day after the Medan talks had concluded, the Lt. Governor-General ad­
vised the Netherlands Indies cabinet that restoration of the East Sumatran kingdoms 
should be avoided, for two reasons: it would lead to serious ethnic conflict, espe­
cially between Malays and Batak; and the "moderate" Malay intellectuals were 
strongly opposed to the conservatism of the sultans and raja. See Memorandum 
from Lt. Gouverneur-Generaal, Batavia, to Directeur Kabinet, Batavia, No. 3346/ 
AgSU, October 4, 1947 (ARA).
48. Besluit Lt. Gouverneur-Generaal, No. 3, October 8, 1947 (Staatsblad No. 176/ 
1947). The full text is given in Kroniek, 1947, p. 37, and Propinsi, p. 221.
49. Letter from Sultan of Langkat to Lt. Gouverneur-Generaal, Batavia, October 
1947 (ARA).
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less than democratic. Moreover, with eleven Malay, two Simalungun, and two Karo 
Batak representatives in the twenty-eight-member house, orang asli and especially 
Malay dominance was maintained. At least twelve of the members belonged to the 
orang asli kerajaan, while all twenty-eight were typical representatives of the pre- 
War colonial Establishment.50
Between November 27 and December 5, 1947, constitutional talks were held in 
Jakarta between the provisional executive of the new state and the Indies govern­
ment. There was amicable agreement on the question of constitutional status within 
a future federal state of Indonesia. 51 At the final session, however, the question 
of ethnic control opened up some fundamental differences between the Dutch and 
the Comite DIST. The latter stood firm in their determination to ensure that control 
of the state remained in the hands of the Malay /orang asli ruling elite. (Earlier, 
two senior Indies officials in Medan had been highly critical of the ethnocentrism of 
Comite DIST leaders.)52 The Dutch pressed the DIST delegation to guarantee that 
all non-Malay ethnic groups would be given proper representation in any future 
government. Mansoer agreed, but went on to distinguish specifically between those 
who were recent immigrants to the region and those who had been there sufficiently 
long to become absorbed into the orang asli cultures. Using the Toba Bataks as an 
example, he differentiated between those who had lived in East Sumatra for more 
than forty years, and consequently were culturally "integrated," and those who 
had migrated more recently and who refused to accept the customs and traditions 
of the regions in which they settled. The latter, he implied, warranted no consid­
eration for franchise or political equality. 53
50. Members of Comite DIST appointed to the new Dewan Sementara were: Tengku 
Hafas (Malay), Orang Kaya Ramli (Malay), Datuk Kamil (Malay), Datuk Hafiz Haber- 
ham (Malay), Abdul Wahab (Malay), Sajoeti (Malay), Mohamad Noeh (Malay), Teng­
ku M. Bahar (Malay), Florencius Lumbantobing (Toba), Dr. F. J. Nainggolan 
(Toba), H. F. Sitompul (Toba), Djaidin Purba (Simalungun), Djomat Purba (Sima­
lungun), Raja Meliala Sembiring (Karo), C. B. W. Manusiwa (East Indonesia),
A. H. F. Rotty (East Indonesia), Tan Boen Djin (Chinese), Tan Wee Beng (Chi­
nese). The additional members appointed were: Tengku Bahriun (Malay), Orang 
Kaja Djafar (Malay), Abdul Rahman (Malay), C. J. J. Hoogenboom (Dutch), D. P. 
van Meerten (Dutch), P. W. Janssen (Dutch), Neroes Ginting Soeka (Karo), R. M. 
Soedardjadi (Javanese), F. Enkorama (Eurasian), and Partap Singh (Indian).
B ukti, p. 22.
51. "Notulen bespreking ontwerp-statuut Soematera Timoer," November 27 and 28, 
December 1 and 2, 1947 (BZ).
52. Letter from Recomba, Medan to Lt. Gouverneur-Generaal, Batavia, No. 488, 
November 21, 1947 (BZ); and letter from Rapolsum, Medan to Lt. Gouverneur- 
Generaal, Batavia, No. 451/Geh., November 25, 1947 (BZ).
53. "Notulen bespreking ontwerp-statuut Soematera Timoer," December 5, 1947 
(BZ). Mansur's forty-year residency period seems to have been merely an arbi­
trary figure used to illustrate a point. Certainly the distinction between culturally 
"integrated" and nonintegrated communities seems to have been one generally held 
by all the orang asli members of the Comite DIST. The notion of cultural integra­
tion of non-orang asli was well understood in Malay society, which had a long tradi­
tion of accepting non-Malays into its ranks provided that the latter converted to 
Islam and accepted and complied with Malay adat. See Tengku Lukman Sinar, "The 
Impact of Dutch Colonialism on the Malay Coastal States on the East Coast of Suma­
tra during the Nineteenth Century," in Papers of the Dutch-1 ndonesian Historical 
Conference 19 to 22 May 1976 (Leiden/Jakarta, 1978), p. 180.
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The East Sumatran State
On December 25, 1947 a second decree by the Lt. Governor-General, "Concern­
ing the Recognition of the State of East Sumatra," established the former Special 
Region (Daerah Istimewa) as the State of East Sumatra (Negara Sumatera Timur-- 
NST). 5I* On January 29, 1948 the NST was officially proclaimed in Medan at a cere­
mony held in the Dewan Sementara. Watched by hundreds of official guests,the 
former chairman of the Comite DIST, Dr. Mansoer, was installed as Head of State 
(Wali Negara). The yellow, white, and green NST flag was officially unfurled for 
the first time.
On December 31, the Dewan Sementara passed a "Law Concerning the State 
Organization of the Negara Sumatera Timur" which approved and ratified the con­
stitutional decree, subject to further changes which might be proposed by the 
Netherlands government.54 5 The haste with which the constitutional provisions 
were drawn up is obvious at first reading. The structure of the state and its gov­
erning institutions are set out in the broadest of terms. Offices and functions are 
defined in only the most cursory fashion. So far as orang asli interests were con­
cerned, the constitution remained silent, apart from a brief reference to the re­
quirement that the Head of State have "special ties with East Sumatra, by reasons 
of history, descent, and custom. . . . "
The NST constitution laid out the very simplest pattern of governmental insti­
tutions. Legislative and executive powers were to reside in three institutions: a 
Dewan Perwakilan (Representative Council) of fifty members; a Badan Amanah 
(Advisory/Executive Council); and the Head of State, the Wali Negara, elected by 
the Dewan for a term of five years. In addition to the Badan Amanah, the Wali 
Negara would be assisted by a five-member cabinet. 56
In mid-February 1948 the Indies government commenced the transference of 
governmental powers to the NST. A further decree of the Lt. Governor-General 
confirmed the legal existence of NST government institutions.57 On March 9, gen­
eral responsibility for internal civilian government was transferred from the Nether­
lands Indies to the NST government.58 Pending the formation of the federal Indo­
nesian state, of which the NST would be a constituent entity, the NST government 
was made responsible to a (Dutch) Crown Commissioner (Commissaris van de Kroon).59
54. Gouvernementsbesluit No. 3, October 8, 1947 (Staatsblad No. 176/1947). See 
Lampiran2 Bagian jang kedoea Kearah Ketertiban Hoekoem Baroe di Indonesia (Bata­
via: Kolff, n .d .) ,  pp. 148-50.
55. "Peratoeran Soesoenan Tata Negara Soematera Timoer," Oendang2 Dewan NST , 
No. 1, December 31, 1947. The full text of the law in given in ib id ., pp. 158-81.
56. R. Sumarsono, "Satu Ichtisar dari Sedjarah Perobahan Ketatanegaraan pada 
waktu ini," in Bestuursvraagstukken. Soal2 Pemerintahan, 1 , 3 (1949), p. 396.
57. Besluit van de Luitenant Gouverneur-Generaal van Nederlands-Indie, No. 1, 
February 16, 1948 (Staatsblad No. 41/1948). See ib id ., pp. 151-57. Also, Recomba, 
Medan, "Verslag . . . Oostkust van Sumatra over de maand Februari 1948" (BZ),
p. 1.
58. Gouvernementsbesluit No. 6, March 9, 1948 (Staatsblad No. 64/1948). At the 
same time as internal security powers were transferred to the NST government, the 
Indies authorities ordered the disbanding of the Poh An Tui in East Sumatra.
59. Kroniek, 1948-49, pp. 31-32. On the office of the Crown Commissioner at this 
time, see Schiller, Formation, p. 36.
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Leadership of the NST was firmly in the hands of members of an orang asli 
elite overwhelmingly of kerajaan origin, aside from the important supervisory role 
exercised by Dutch officials. Commenting on the composition of the executive and 
civil service leadership of the NST, the Indies Government Advisor for Political 
Affairs for Sumatra, Dr. van de Velde, remarked:
The Wali Negara himself and all the Indonesian dignitaries, with the excep­
tion of two, are from the sultanate families and the two exceptions are non- 
Sumatrans, v iz . , East Indonesians. Moreover, two of the department heads, 
Tengku Bahriun and Tengku Sulung, are brothers of Tengku Dzulkarnain, 
so it is no wonder that the Republican press talks about a "feudal clique." 60
Dr. Mansoer's speech to the first session of the Dewan Perwakilan,on March 15, 
illustrated glaringly the aristocratic values of the NST leadership by his patroniz­
ing distinction between "us" (the rulers) and "them" (the ruled). Once again the 
Social Revolution did not escape bitter reference. 61
The NST elite had moved quickly to revive some of the important institutional 
expressions of pre-Social Revolution "normalcy." One was the Dutch language and 
an identification with Dutch culture. Dutch joined Malay as an official language for 
the conduct of government business. In August and September 1948 an Orange 
Festival (Oranjefeest) was held throughout the NST to celebrate the fiftieth anni­
versary of the reign of Queen Wilhelmina and the accession of Juliana to the Dutch 
throne. Led by NST government leaders, the festivities were held in grand style, 
far outstripping those held to mark the establishment of the NST itself. 62 Those 
key institutions in the day-to-day functioning of colonial rule before 1942--the 
Medan Club, the Medan Golf Club, and the Deli Yacht Club--had all been reopened. 
Through them the survivors of the pre-War colonial Establishment planned policies 
for and helped to administer the NST. It was not uncommon for Dutch officials to 
comment specifically on the "Dutchness" of the cultural milieu surrounding the NST 
elite. One senior Dutch official, for example, wrote at the time:
The Wali Negara, Dr. Mansoer, is undoubtedly a man of quality, who com­
bines intelligence with bonhomie. He is to an important degree Holland- 
oriented, such that one hears him use the term "we Hollanders" in casual 
conversation. 63
60. Letter from Rapolsum, Medan to Lt. Gouverneur-Generaal, Batavia, No. 36/ 
Z .G ., February 27, 1948 (ARA). The five-member cabinet appointed by Dr. Man­
soer consisted of: the Sultan of Asahan, Tengku Bahriun, Tengku Hafas, and the 
two Indies government advisors to the Comite DIST, Forch and van Gelder. The 
seven-member Advisory/Executive Council consisted of Tengku Bahar (Malay), 
Datuk Kamil (Malay), Raja Kaliamsjah Sinaga (Simalungun), Raja Meliala Sembiring 
(Karo), Tan Boen Djin (Chinese), D. P. van Meerten (Dutch), and A. H. Rotty 
(East Indonesia). Negara Soematera Timoer Sepintas Laloe, pp. 27-28.
61. The full text of Mansoer's speech is given in Negara Soematera Timoer, Pidato 
Wali Negara Soematera Timoer pada ketika pembukaan sidang pertama Dewan Perwa- 
kilan 15-3-1948 (Medan, 1948), and Propinsi, pp. 223-29.
62. See Kroniek, 1948-49, pp. 281-85.
63. Algemeen Vertegenwoordiger van de Secretaris van Staat voor Economische 
Zaken, Batavia, "Besprekingen te Medan/Jhr. Mr.C. H. V. de Villeneuve 12-16 
December 1948" (BZ), p. 2.
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The Land Problem
Ethnic antagonisms in East Sumatra had long been focused upon the question 
of communal land rights and infringements by the plantation economy upon those 
rights. 64 Since the Japanese occupation in 1942 there had been a rapid decline in 
the plantation economy. Vast areas of plantation land had been turned over to 
small-holder cultivation by former plantation laborers, most of whom were Javanese. 
By the beginning of 1948 thousands of hectares of former plantation land were 
being cultivated by such "squatter" farmers. 65 The leaders of the East Sumatra 
state movement were determined that the squatters be removed, the plantations re­
turned to commercial production, and the special orang asli usage rights to planta­
tion land restored. 66
After 1947, the squatter settlements were scenes of frequent violence. In Deli 
groups of militant Malay youth began attacking and attempting to evict non-Malay 
farmers, both Javanese and Karo, from land they regarded as traditionally Malay.67 
These attacks led to a widening incidence of violent clashes between Malay and non- 
Malay farmers. 68 One effect of this violence was further to diminish support for 
the NST among the non-Malay orang asli. Not only Javanese and Toba, but also 
Karo and Simalungun peasant farmers responded more and more favorably to calls 
from Republican activists to resist the reimposition of Dutch colonialism and Malay 
feudalism.
The authorities were thus faced with a "land problem" 69 that not only frus­
trated their attempts to give the state a viable economic base, but had become a 
highly emotional issue. The result was a "tough" stance and frequent overreac­
tion by Malay leaders in the NST government. 70 Police and plantation guards
64. See Reid, Blood, pp. 48 f f .; Reid and Shiraishi, eds., "Rural"; O'Malley, 
"Indonesia," pp. 131 f f . ; and van Langenberg, "North Sumatra 1942-1945."
65. H. G. van der Weij, "The Deli Tobacco Cultivation and Its Recovery," The 
Economic Review of Indonesia, 1, 12 (December 1947), pp. 189-91.
66. In November 1947 the Comite DIST had given an undertaking to the DPV to 
support the removal of squatters and the restoration of the land concerned to the 
tobacco plantations. See Recomba, Medan, "Verslag . . . Negara Soematera Ti- 
moer . . . April 1948V (ARA), p. 5. The orang asli usage rights referred to here 
are the so-called jaluran rights to plantation lands. See Pelzer, Planter, pp. 66-85, 
and R. C. de Iongh, "The Guardians of the Land: Sultans, Planters, Farmers and 
Tobacco Land in East Sumatra," in Austrina, ed. R. A. Davis (Sydney: Oriental 
Society of Australia, 1981).
67. Tengku Lukman Sinar, "Tragedi Tanah Djaluran di Sumatera Utara" (unpub­
lished ms., 1972), p. 15.
68. See Waspada, April 10, 18, and 29, 1948.
69. See Recomba, Medan, "Verslag . . . Negara Soematera Timoer . . . April 1948" 
(ARA), pp. 5-7, and "Verslag . . . Mei 1948" (ARA), pp. 4-5, 10, and 15.
70. Senior NST government leaders began demanding firm action to evict the squat­
ters. At the Dewan NST session on May 10, 1948, the Director of the NST Cabinet, 
Tengku Hafas, pointing to the Republican sympathies of the squatter communities, 
urged their physical removal. Kroniek, 1948-49, pp. 54-55. The question of Malay 
land rights soon had produced a militant, anti government minority within the NST 
ruling elite. Led by activists from the PNST, it attacked the NST government for 
failing to pursue the recovery of Malay lands with sufficient vigor. By the end of 
January 1949 an East Sumatra People's Party (Partai Ra'yat Sumatera Timur--PRST)
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began arresting and evicting squatter farmers. Bulldozers were sent in to dig up 
the farms and demolish buildings.71 By 1949, the NST and the Malays were clearly 
losing the struggle. No sooner were evicted squatters released from custody and 
police or plantation guards moved than the land in question would be reoccupied 
and cultivation recommenced. With squatter resistance increasingly being orga­
nized by Republican activists, the pattern of eviction and reoccupation soon be­
came ritualistic. 72 The more the NST government and the plantation companies 
tried to evict squatters the stronger and more widespread peasant support for the 
Republican political alternative to the NST became.
The land problem not only undermined the NST's legitimacy as the defender 
of orang asli, as distinct from specifically Malay, rights, but also threatened the 
very base of the NST economy. Since the conclusion of the Dutch military action 
in 1947 a great deal of effort on the part of the Dutch, the Comite DIST (and NST 
leadership), and the plantation companies had gone into effecting a restoration of 
the pre-War economy. 73 74 By the end of 1947 most of the plantations had been 
brought within Dutch-controlled (and subsequently NST) territory. 71* Some 208 
plantations were soon afterwards returned to their former owners. 75
The high incidence of squatter cultivation, however, not only limited the acre­
age that could in practice be returned to commercial cultivation but was also the 
cause of a severe labor shortage. The thousands of former plantation workers who 
had become squatter farmers were disinclined to return to the lower status occu­
pation of full-time wage labor employment. 76 Both the planters' associations,
had been formed for this purpose. It accused the NST of having abandoned the 
rights of Malay farmers to non-Malay and foreign corporations. Algemeen Secre- 
taris, Wali Negara van Soematera Timoer, "Verslag . . . over de maand Januari 
1949" (BZ), pp. 7-8.
71. See Waspada, June 1, 17, 23, and 28, 1948; and Ketetapan Wali Negara Soema­
tera Timoer No. 16, June 23, 1948, in Warta Rasmi Negara Soematera Timoer No. 
14/1948; and Haliman, "Sumbangan untuk Mempeladjari Pertentangan antara Golo- 
ngan-Golongan di Sumatera Utara" (B.A. thesis, Universitas Sumatera Utara,
1957), p. 76.
72. See Waspada, June 30, 1948; and Hoofd van het Bureau der Landinrichting, 
Bogor, "Reisrapport No. 10 naar de Negara Soematera Timoer van 27 t/m 31 Juli 
1948," pp. 11-13.
73. See Algemeen Vertegenwoordiger van de Secretaris van Staat voor Economische 
Zaken, Batavia, "Besprekingen te Medan/Jhr. Mr.C. H. V. de Villeneuve 12-16 
December 1948" (BZ), p. 1.
74. See P. M. Prillwitz, "Production Possibilities of the Estates within the Demarca­
tion Lines in Java and Sumatra," The Economic Review of Indonesia, 2, 3 (1948),
p. 34. Details of particular plantations restored to their former owners during 
1947 are given in The Economic Review of Indonesia, 1, 9 (1947), pp. 138-39.
75. The 208 consisted of 113 rubber, 41 tobacco, 15 tea, 14 oil palm, 7 coconut, 
and 5 fiber plantations. Of these, 163 (86 rubber, 35 tobacco, 15 tea, 15 oil palm,
7 coconut, and 5 fiber) had been partially restored to production. Recomba, Medan, 
"Verslag . . . Negara Soematera Timoer . . . Februari 1948" (BZ), p. 5. See also 
The Economic Review of Indonesia, 2, 4 (1948), p. 54; and J. G. J. A. Maas, "The 
Recovery of the Perennial Export Crops in East Sumatra," The Economic Review of 
Indonesia, 2, 1 (1948), pp. 1-4.
76. Between March 1942 and January 1948 the number of full-time plantation work­
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AVROS and DPV, urged a resumption of the importation of contract labor from 
Java. However, the prospect of a further increase in the non-orang asli popula­
tion of East Sumatra contradicted the basic rationale for the existence of 
the NST. Its leaders therefore firmly refused to countenance such a solution. 77 
The problem remained unresolved while mutual irritation between the two planters' 
associations and the NST increased. As a result,AVROS and the DPV both began 
to qualify their support for the NST and turned towards improving relations with 
the Republic. 78
Ending the Native States
Meanwhile, the second half of 1948 saw the formal dismantling of the structure 
of autonomous "native states," which began when the newly established Interim 
Federal Government of Indonesia79 effected the final transfer of specific govern­
mental powers from the Netherlands Indies government to that of the NST. 80 These 
powers included those formerly enjoyed by the native rulers. On July 19, 1948, 
the Dewan NST legislated the transfer of all the rulers' residual political authority 
and administrative functions to the NST government. 81
In spite of, and because of, these developments the kerajaan ruling families 
began organizing in defense of their interests. In Deli two political organizations,
ers in East Sumatra dropped from 208,800 to 72,400. Recomba, Medan, "Verslag 
. . . Negara Soematera Timoer . . . Mei 1948" (ARA), p. 7. Between January and 
October 1948, as the number of plantations restored to production increased rapid­
ly, the workforce increased to over 160,000. Ib id ., p. 7; Algemeen Secretaris,
Wali Negara van Soematera Timoer, Medan, "Verslag . . . September 1948," p. 14 
and "Politieke . . . verslag . . . November 1948" (BZ), p. 16. Yet even this in­
crease in labor fell far short of company expectations. In October 1948 the AVROS 
chairman announced that a "serious" labor shortage still existed on the plantations. 
See Waspada, October 29, 1948. A detailed breakdown of the plantation workforce 
as of the end of May 1948, according to plantation company and type of plantation, 
is given in Algemeen Secretaris, Wali Negara van Soematera Timoer, Medan, "Ver­
slag . . . Juli 1948," Bijlage II (B Z), pp. 1-3.
77. Letter from Voorzitter van de AVROS, Medan, to Hoofd van het Departement 
van Bestuur van de NST, Medan, No. 94, January 18, 1949, and Letter from Rapol- 
sum, Medan, to Directeur Kabinet, Batavia, October 15, 1948 (ARA).
78. This mounting dispute between the planters' associations and the NST is ex­
tensively documented in Ged. HVK Soematera Timoer, Medan, "Maandrapport over 
September 1949" (ARA), pp. 8-10; Letter from Ged. HVK, Medan to HVK, Batavia, 
No. 831/Z.G., November 21, 1949 (ARA); Brieftelegram from Ged. HVK, Medan to 
HVK, Batavia, No. 780, October 22, 1949 (BZ); Letter from HVK, Batavia, to Alge­
meen Secretaris, Batavia, No. 164, December 9, 1949 (BZ); Telegram from Regvind., 
Batavia to Ged. HVK, Medan, No. 8708, September 27, 1949 (ARA); and Codetele­
gram from Ged. HVK, Medan to Regvind. , Batavia, No. 4665, October 18, 1949 
(ARA).
79. See Schiller, Formation, p. 45.
80. Staatsblad Nos. 125-131/1948, 157-159/1948, 175/1948, 184/1948, 221/1948, 
and 320/1948.
81. "Oendang2 Dewan NST 'Penjerahan Kekoeasaan Keradjaan dan Alat2 Goeber- 
noermen,"' in Warta Rasmi Negara Soematera Timoer, No. 17/1948. See also Schil­
ler, Formation, p. 325.
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led by senior members of the Deli kerajaan, were formed for this purpose. The 
Party of the People of Deli (Partai Anak Deli--Padi) was formed to represent the 
special political interests of subjects of the Deli sultanate. It called for a federa­
tion of East Sumatra kingdoms, along Malayan lines. The Deli Union (Deli Sepakat), 
under the personal patronage of the sultan, presented itself as the protector of 
the cultural values underlying the political aims of Padi. 82 Shortly afterwards Deli 
Union fused with the first of the pro-sultanate parties, the PNST.83 84 By February 
1949, similar unions (sepakat) had been formed for the Serdang and Langkat sul­
tanates. Called the Partai Serdang Sepakat and the Partai Langkat Sepakat, they 
pressed essentially the same demands as those of their counterparts in Deli. 81*
The Sultan of Deli now publicly took up the case for the traditional kingdoms, 
reiterating demands that the kingdoms be reorganized into a federation on the 
Malayan model. Together with other rulers, he pressed the Dutch to continue 
recognition of the rights guaranteed the kingdoms under the pre-War contracts.85 
On January 29, 1949 a resolution to this effect was issued in the name of the King­
dom of Deli and signed by the sultan, the members of the royal council ( raad van 
landsgroten') and by the regional chiefs for Bedagai and Padang. The resolution, 
presented to the Dutch Crown Commissioner in Medan, demanded that, pending a 
final decision on the future status of the traditional kingdoms within the proposed 
federal Indonesian state, all pre-War autonomous powers be restored immediately 
to the sultanate. 86
On February 20, the Sultan of Deli convened a meeting of eleven prominent 
orang asli rulers (those of Asahan, Langkat, Serdang, Kualuh Leidong, Indrapura, 
Kotapinang, Limapuluh, Tanah Datar, Siantar, and Sukudua) at his palace. The 
rulers agreed that some joint action in defense of the kingdoms was imperative.
On March l,they submitted a joint resolution to the Netherlands Indies and Interim 
Federal Indonesia governments, which reiterated previous assertions as to the con­
tinued legality of the contracts between the East Sumatra kingdoms and the Indies 
government. The rulers declared their support for and commitment to the terms of 
the contracts. The resolution also repeated the earlier proposal by the Sultan of 
Langkat for the establishment of a council of rulers and adat chiefs as an essential 
institution within the NST political structure. 87
The question of the status of the kingdoms remained at the forefront of politi­
cal debate within the NST over the next year. But the rulers' demands met with
82. On Padi and Deli Sepakat, see Recomba, Medan, "Verslag betreffende de poli- 
tieke en economische toestand in de Negara Soematera Timoer over de maand Maart 
1948" (ARA), pp. 3-4; and Algemeen Secretaris, Wali Negara van Soematera Timoer, 
Medan, "Maandverslag betreffende de politieke en economische toestand in de Ne­
gara Soematera Timoer over de maand Augustus 1948" (BZ), p. 2.
83. Recomba, Medan, "Verslag . . . Negara Soematera Timoer . . . Mei 1948"
(ARA), pp. 2-3.
84. Algemeen Secretaris, Wali Negara van Soematera Timoer, Medan, "Verslag 
. . . over de maand Februari 1949" (BZ), p. 2.
85. Waspada, June 19 and July 19, 1948.
86. Raad van Landsgroten Keradjaan Negeri Deli, Medan, Kepoetoesan 29 Januari 
1949, appended to letter from Comkrost, Medan, to HVK, Batavia, No. 389, Febru­
ary 1, 1949 (ARA).
87. Sultan of Deli et al. to HVK, Batavia, March 2, 1949 (ARA).
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firm opposition from key figures in the NST regime, 88 who insisted that any recog­
nition of "autonomous" kingdoms would seriously compromise the territorial sover­
eignty of the East Sumatran state. Dr. Mansoer, in particular, showed little incli­
nation to compromise with the rulers' demands. In his opening speech to the Dew an 
NST session on March 21, 1949 he laid special emphasis on the need for the former 
kingdoms to be absorbed into the NST polity, in order to ensure complete autonomy 
for the NST itself. 89
By late 1949, as the transfer of sovereignty to an independent Indonesia was 
becoming imminent, the debate came to a rapid end. A clear majority of members 
of the Dewan NST (notably the non-Malay members) had made it known that they 
would reject any attempt at restoration of the kingdoms. 90 The "native states" 
were clearly relics of a past era, and their restoration a lost cause. By mid-1950, 
even that most ardent champion of the traditional kingdoms, the Sultan of Deli, 
was prepared to announce that he no longer had any objections to the dissolution 
of both the "native states" and the NST itself and the establishment of a unitary, 
independent Indonesian republic (provided East Sumatra was granted adequate 
autonomy within it). 91
Defending the Orang Asti.
If the question of the future of the native states had split the orang asli elite 
once the NST had been established, there was no such dissension concerning that 
elite's commitment to orang asli hegemony. At the end of 1948, for example, the 
General Representative of the Secretary for Economic Affairs in the Interim Federal 
Indonesian Government, reporting on the operations of the NST administration, 
wrote that:
. . . Indonesian political authority rests upon and stems from one group: 
the Malays. They scrupulously exclude the "foreign" Indonesian elements 
(Bataks, Javanese) from this milieu; the Chinese are allowed to participate.
So it is too with the (in fact appointed) Negara Council. Not unjustly then 
has East Sumatra acquired the alternative name of Mansoerije [Mansoerland] .92
88. For accounts of these debates, see Algemeen Secretaris, Wali Negara van Soe- 
matera Timoer, Medan, "Verslag . . . Maart 1949" (BZ), p. 2, and "Verslag . . . 
April 1949" (BZ), p. 3; Letter from Rapolsum, Medan, to Secretaris van Staat voor 
Zelfbestuurszaken, Batavia, No. 120/Z.G., January 18, 1949 (ARA); Letter from 
HVK, Batavia, to Minog., Hague, No. 1407/Geh. , March 10, 1949 (ARA); and 
Letter from Comkrost, Medan, to Algemeen Secretaris, Batavia, No. 470/Geh., 
March 15, 1949 (ARA).
89. Algemeen Secretaris, Wali Negara van Soematera Timoer, Medan, "Verslag . . . 
Maart 1949" (BZ), pp. 2-4.
90. Ged. HVK Soematera Timoer, Medan, "Maandrapport over September 1949" 
(ARA), p. 1.
91. Merdeka, July 25, 1950.
92. Algemeen Vertegenwoordiger van de Secretaris van Staat voor Economische 
Zaken, Batavia, "Besprekingen te Medan/Jhr. Mr. C. H. V. de Villeneuve 12-16 
December 1948" (BZ), p. 2. On the popular reference at the time to the NST as 
Negara Mansoerije (Mansoer Land), See Louis Vrooland, Indonesia. Een Tropen- 
journaal (Amsterdam: Scheltens & Giltay, 1950), p. 193.
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The first session of the Dewan NST in March 1948 had resolved to increase the 
size of the council from twenty-eight to thirty-five and to provide a more equitable 
ethnic "balance.” The number of Karo representatives was increased from two to 
five, of Simalungun representatives from two to four, and of Javanese from one to 
four. The number of Malay representatives was reduced from eleven to nine, and 
an additional seat was provided for ethnic groups not specifically represented in 
the Dewan. 93 94 This move was effected primarily in response to Dutch pressure for 
greater democratization of the political system, but also because of Karo and Sima­
lungun demands for greater representation of the non-Malay orang asli. Yet this 
expansion and change in Dewan NST in fact made no difference to the reality of 
specifically Malay and generally orang asli dominance of the government; the changes 
were purely cosmetic.
The largest single ethnic group in East Sumatra, the Javanese, remained ex­
cluded from serious participation in government decision making. This exclusion 
was maintained not only because the size of the ethnic Javanese population in the 
region posed an obvious threat to orang asli interests but also because of the way 
in which many NST leaders, given their colonial Establishment orientation, tended 
to view the Javanese in East Sumatra. In their eyes, the mass of the Javanese 
community were mere coolies, indentured laborers, who up till now had been simply 
pawns in the hands of Republican leaders in Java and of communists and extremists 
in Sumatra. By considering the Javanese as uneducated, politically naive and, 
hence, easily "managed" by whoever controlled the political system as a whole, 
they saw little need for anything more than token gestures. The Toba Batak were 
a much more immediate threat to the communal interests which the NST sought to 
protect. Socially aggressive, relatively well educated, and communally cohesive 
via the mutually reinforcing institutions of clan and church, the Toba Batak had 
begun moving in increasing numbers into East Sumatra since the Japanese occupa­
tion. 91* Many orang asli had long viewed the Toba Batak in East Sumatra as little 
more than an advance guard for tens of thousands of their compatriots over the 
border in Tapanuli who were waiting for an opportunity to descend upon and seize 
the riches of the east coast. Consequently, so far as the NST elite were concerned, 
the Toba had to be denied access to any real political power within the NST, but 
at the same time sufficiently accommodated to minimize their alienation.
It was a strategy with little hope of success. Not only did the long-standing 
communal hostilities between the Toba and the orang asli ensure that the great 
majority of Toba in East Sumatra remained committed supporters of the Republic, 
but even those few Toba who had been prepared to back the East Sumatra state 
movement soon became disillusioned with what that state was offering them. 95 As
93. Algemeen Secretaris, Wali Negara van Soematera Timoer, Medan, "Verslag be- 
treffende de politieke en economische toestand in de Negara Soematera Timoer over 
de maand Juli 1948" (BZ), p. 1.
94. See Paul B. Pedersen, "Religion as the Basis of Social Change among the 
Bataks of North Sumatra" (Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, 1969), 
and Clark E. Cunningham, Postwar Migrations of the Toba Bataks to East Sumatra, 
Cultural Report Series No. 5 (New Haven: Yale Southeast Asian Studies, 1958).
95. At the end of February 1948 the Rapolsum had complained to the Lt. Governor- 
General that the anti-Toba prejudices of many NST leaders were alienating a large 
minority of the population. He criticized NST leaders with "feudal" backgrounds 
for being unable to construct a sufficiently "democratic" polity. See letter from 
Rapolsum, Medan, to Lt. Gouverneur-Generaal, Batavia, No. 36/Z.G., February 
27, 1948 (ARA). Early in April the Crown Commissioner in Medan reported that
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a result, soon after the formation of the NST these Toba established a political 
party specifically to act for the protection of the interests of all Tapanuli Batak 
in East Sumatra. The party, the Tapanuli Association (Persatuan Tapanuli--Perta) 
had two main objectives: first, to counter the continued protection of orang asli 
privilege within the NST and the detrimental effects this was having on the inter­
ests of local Tapanuli Batak and, second, the establishment of a Batak state in 
Tapanuli along the lines of the NST. 96
It was virtually inevitable that establishment of the NST would heighten com­
munal hostilities between the orang asli and other ethnic groups in East Sumatra, 
and heighten support for the Republic o f Indonesia among the non-orang asli com­
munities. 97 Moreover, the obvious kerajaan dominance of the NST, notwithstanding 
the diminution of the rulers’ powers, helped to spread anti-NST feeling into the 
ranks of the non-Malay orang asli as well. Already long-established anti-kerajaan 
movements among the Karo and Simalungun acted as important mobilizers of mass 
opposition to what was seen by many as a restoration of the old "feudal" colonial 
system. 98 Furthermore, Dutch insistence on the NST having at least some of the 
trappings of a pluralist democracy ensured the continued existence of a legal pro- 
Republican political opposition through which such ethnic and class-based anti-NST 
sentiments could be organized. 99
the "problem" of achieving adequate Toba participation in the NST political system 
had still not been solved. See Recomba, Medan, "Verslag . . . Negara Soematera 
Timoer . . . Maart 1948" (ARA), p. 2. Shortly after this, the Rapolsum reported 
that Toba leaders were accusing those of the orang asli communities of refusing to 
contemplate an equitable alliance between the NST and Tapanuli out of a fear that 
the Tapanuli Batak, because of their greater energy and intellectual strength, 
would eventually seize the leadership of the NST. "It is nevertheless known," he 
added, "that the Negara was brought into existence by the actions of the Malay 
intellectuals and that representation and participation of the Javanese and Batak 
communities in the legislative council and the government leaves much to be de­
sired." Letter from Rapolsum, Medan, to Lt. Gouverneur-Generaal, Batavia, No. 
16/Z.G., April 21, 1948 (ARA).
96. Recomba, Medan, "Verslag . . . Negara Soematera Timoer . . . Maart 1948" 
(ARA), p. 2.
97. In mid-December 1948 the Rapolsum had reported that the political leaders of 
the NST were deliberately applying a policy of orang asli domination of the govern­
ment and the exclusion of all other ethnic groups. Letter from Rapolsum, Medan, 
to HVK, Batavia, No. 120/Z.G., December 18, 1948 (ARA).
98. On the development of anti-kerajaan movements among the Karo and Sima­
lungun, see Niblett, "The Development of Nationalist Activity," pp. 37-40; Ent- 
wistle, "The Pergerakan Movement," passim; Reid, "The Japanese Occupation and 
Rival Indonesian Elites," and Blood, pp. 38 f f .; Reid and Shiraishi, "Rural Unrest" 
van Langenberg, "North Sumatra 1942-1945," and "National," passim. On the im­
portant role of the Karo in the collapse of the NST during the first half of 1950, 
see van Langenberg, "National," pp. 821 ff.
99. This Republican opposition found its focus in a National Front (Front Nasional) 
On the Front Nasional’s activities within the NST, see van Langenberg, "National," 
pp. 646-51. The opposition also spread widely through "nonpolitical" organizations 
such as the Muhammadiyah, the Batak Christian churches (particularly the Toba 
Batak church), the Taman Siswa, peasants' associations, and a wide range of com­
munal social organizations such as ethnic, clan, and adat associations, as well as 
clubs and other societies. Reports of such activities are given in Waspada, Septem
27
The End of the NST
By the beginning of 1950, with the departure of Dutch military forces and the 
transfer of sovereignty to the new federal government, the NST undoubtedly en­
joyed the committed support of the ethnic Malay population. But that was all.
The overwhelming majority of the non-Malay ethnic communities were supporters 
of the Republican alternative, and together they made up a large majority of the 
total population of East Sumatra. In the urban kampungs, on the plantations, and 
in the villages, hundreds of thousands of such people saw the NST as simply a 
restoration of the pre-War colonial condition, compounded by a resurgent Malay 
feudalism.100 10
Anti-Malay, anti-kerajaan and anti-Dutch sentiments fused in a common feeling 
of antipathy towards the NST in the minds of those who by 1950 had chosen to com­
mit their loyalties to the Republic of Indonesia. Moreover, many of these people 
believed the NST was frustrating material aspirations which had developed since 
the Japanese occupation. Javanese plantation laborers, Tapanuli Batak migrants, 
Karo and Simalungun Batak disaffected with their traditional rulers, all had mate­
rial expectations of independence (merdeka) which were in direct contradiction 
with the aims of those who led and supported the NST. By promising to redistrib­
ute the vast foreign and seetionally controlled resources, the Republic appeared 
to offer hopes for the realization of these aspirations.
From early December 1949 (as sovereignty was being finally transferred by the 
Dutch) organized anti-NST activity mushroomed. By the end of January 1950 a 
mass-based, vocal anti-NST movement was active throughout the territory. It en­
compassed political parties, trade unions, religious organizations, youth and women's 
groups, as well as cultural and ethnic associations. Mass demonstrations, public 
meetings and resolutions, strikes, occupation of plantation lands, were sill aimed at 
the destruction of the NST.1U1 The labor unions, led by the East Sumatra Regional 
Committee of the All-Indonesian Trade Union Federation (Panitia Daerah Vaksentral 
Seluruh Indonesia Sumatera Timur), began strike action in opposition to the NST
ber 27, October 15, and November 11, 1947, March 3 and 4, May 14, and June 30, 
1948; Rapolsum, Medan, "Politiek Verslag van Sumatra over Maart 1948" (ARA), p.
3; Recomba, Medan, "Verslag . . . Negara Soematera Timoer . . . Maart 1948" 
(ARA), pp. 4-5, and."Verslag . . . Mei 1948" (ARA), pp. 1-2; and Letter from 
Rapolsum, Medan, to Directeur Kabinet, Batavia, October 15, 1948 (ARA). At the 
same time there was also an active Republican press, led by two of the largest daily 
newspapers in Medan, Mimbar Umum and Waspada. Dutch estimates placed the aver­
age daily circulations of these two papers at 2,000 and 1,800 copies respectively. 
Readership of each paper would have been at least ten times this. Recomba, Medan, 
"Verslag . . . Negara Soematera Timoer . ; . Mei 1948" (ARA), pp. 9-12. There 
were also a number of weeklies and monthlies published in several towns in the 
NST: for example, Waktoe, Pedoman, Setaraf, Angkatan Muda, Berita Front Nasio- 
nal, Pemuda, Merdeka, Mimbar, and Mimbar Islam. Details of this Republican oppo­
sition within the NST are given in van Langenberg, "National," pp. 630 ff.
100. In October 1948 the Rapolsum reported that political support for the NST out­
side the Medan area was very low, despite the propaganda efforts of the NST gov­
ernment. See Letter from Rapolsum, Medan, to Directeur Kabinet, Batavia, October 
15, 1948 (ARA).
101. For a detailed account of the developments during the first eight months of 
1950 leading to the eventual dissolution of the NST, see van Langenberg, "Nation­
al," pp. 840-917.
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government. The main farmers' organizations--Serikat Tani, Gerakan Tani, and 
Barisan Tani Indonesia--promoted further occupation of the plantation lands, pre­
senting them as "rewards of the Revolution [ hadiah revolusi] . " 102 in the first 
three months of independence in 1950 still more erstwhile plantation workers joined 
the big population of squatter farmers cultivating former estate lands. They in 
turn were joined by Tapanuli Batak living in Simalungun, by Karo in Langkat and 
Deli, by newly arrived migrants from Tapanuli itself and by others from the Karo 
highlands. In their thousands these people moved onto the plantation lands bor­
dering the highways from Medan to Tebingtinggi, Tanjung Balai, and Rantau Pra- 
pat in the south; to Binjei and Tanjung Pura in the north; and on to the estates 
surrounding Medan itself.103 In Tanah Karo, Asahan, and Labuhan Batu, local 
anti-NST organizations held mass rallies demanding separation of those regions 
from the NST and incorporation into a unitary Republic of Indonesia.104 Support 
and protection for such anti-NST rallies were provided by Republican military units.
On February 6, 1950 the Director of the NST Cabinet, Tengku Hafas, announced 
that this state of affairs had "given rise to internal conflicts which have destroyed 
our unity."105 By early May, the Dewan NST had agreed to negotiations with the 
federal Indonesian government on the eventual incorporation of East Sumatra into 
a unitary state.106 Dr. Mansoer empowered the federal government and Prime Min­
ister Hatta to act on behalf of the NST in negotiations for the setting up of the uni­
tary state.107 On August 13, 1950 the NST effectively came to an end when the 
Dewan NST approved legislation dissolving the state and incorporating East Suma­
tra into a unitary Republic of Indonesia.108
Conclusion
The NST was one of the last two Dutch-established regional states within fed­
eral Indonesia to be dismantled. That it survived longer than all but one of the 
other states suggests a relatively strong and resilient internal structure.109 But
102. Waspada, March 11, 22, and 28, April 5 and 8, August 19 and 31, 1950. Also 
Sinar, "Tragedi," p. 13; and John C. Sutter, "Indonesianisasi: Politics in a Chang­
ing Economy 1940-1955" (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1959), p. 273.
This view of former plantation land as a hadiah revolusi was confirmed by several 
informants, particularly Toba and Karo Batak, in interviews conducted between 
1969 and 1971. See also Cunningham, Postwar, p. 108.
103. I. J. Kasimo and Jusuf Muda Dalam, "Pelaporan. Penyelidikan di Sumatera 
Timur tentang soal tanah2 perkebunan dan pemakaian tanah2 bekas perkebunan 
oleh rakyat" (Jakarta, May 1950) ("Kasimo Report"); Ahmad Fauzi Ridwan, "Sekitar 
Perkembangan Hukum Tanah Dalam Tindjauan Masa Lampau dan Datang (Sebelum 
UUPA I960)" (B.A. thesis, Universitas Sumatera Utara, 1965), p. 61; Sinar, "Tra­
gedi," p. 13; and Cunningham, Postwar, p. 92.
104. The movement in Tanah Karo became known by its watchword Aksi Tuntutan 
Rakyat (Action for the People's Demands). See van Langenberg, "National," pp. 
856 ff.
105. Waspada, February 7, 1950.
106. Ibid., May 12, 1950.
107. Ibid., May 15, 1950, and Merdeka, May 15, 1950.
108. Propinsi, pp. 397-98.
109. See Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 73 n. 43.
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its survival had been possible mainly because the NST leaders had been able to ex­
ploit the concern of the federal Indonesian government, and especially that of Prime 
Minister Hatta, to ensure an orderly and stable transition to a unitary state. NST 
leaders utilized the huge importance of East Sumatra to the national economy to re­
inforce Hatta's concern for social and economic stability. The intensity of political 
opposition to the NST within East Sumatra in the early months of 1950, against the 
recent background of the violent Social Revolution of 1946, raised the specter of 
this vital region falling once again into the hands of "radicals" and "extremists." 
For Hatta and his supporters in Jakarta it was important that the NST government 
be preserved right up to the time it could be replaced by a reasonably strong mod­
erate Republican administration. In the end that moderate administration was set 
up under the control of the local military command and under the supervision of a 
Military Governor.
The brief history of the NST serves to demonstrate that the years of National 
Revolution (1945-50) were as important for the formation of a national identity as 
for its assertion. The ethnic and class conflicts which gave birth to and helped 
destroy the NST were intimately connected to the question of national identity.
The politics of 1947-50 in East Sumatra were to a great extent about the definition, 
acceptance, or rejection of an Indonesian national identity. In the process not 
only was East Sumatra finally incorporated into the Indonesian nation-state, but 
the Indonesian nation-state itself began to be incorporated into the cultural "worlds" 
of East Sumatra.
If ethnic and class antagonisms were important elements in the immediate de­
colonizing process in East Sumatra, they have remained as destabilizing forces in 
post-colonial regional and national politics in Indonesia. During the 1950s and 
early 1960s political conflicts over the conditions of wage labor and access to farm­
ing land occurred frequently in East Sumatra. These conflicts were most overtly 
manifested in strikes and the occupation of plantation lands.110 At the same time, 
ethnic conflict between orang asli and non-orang asli, and between Malays and non- 
Malays has been a continuing feature of internal politics within East Sumatra and 
of center-regional political relations between Jakarta and East Sumatra.111
In the mid-1950s orang asli resentment against what they saw as increasing 
Toba Batak control of the provincial political economy brought about a brief re­
appearance of the East Sumatra state movement.112 "Land rights" ( hak-hak tanah)
110. See numerous reports in the Medan daily Waspada between 1950 and 1965.
Also D. J. Blake, "Labour Shortage and Unemployment in North-East Sumatra," 
Malayan Economic Review, 7, 2 (October 1962), pp. 106-18; and "The Estates and 
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Government Estates and Their Masters," Pacific Affairs, 34, 4 (Winter 1962), pp. 
337-60; Douglas Paauw, ed ., Prospects for East Sumatran Plantation Industries, 
Monograph Series No. 3 (New Haven: Yale Southeast Asian Studies, 1962); Karl J. 
Pelzer, "The Agrarian Conflict in East Sumatra," Pacific Affairs, 30, 2 (Summer 
1957), pp. 151-59; R. A. Sianipar, e d ., Konperensi Pertama Pertanian se-Sumatera 
Utara (Medan: Kemudi, 1958); Sutter, "Indonesianisasi," pp. 725-26; K. Tobing, 
Sumatera Utara (Jakarta: Lintasan Masa, 1953); and Monografi Daerah Sumatera 
Timur (Pematang Siantar: Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Nommensen, 1964).
111. John R. W. Smail, "The Military Politics of North Sumatra, December 1956- 
October 1957," Indonesia, 6 (October 1968), pp. 128-87; and Feith, Decline, pp. 
520-38.
112. In late 1956, an East Sumatra People's Congress (Kongres Rakyat Sumatera
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and the "land problem" (soal tanah) have remained a central political issue in East 
Sumatra since the formation of the unitary Republic o f Indonesia thirty years ago. 
They have provided continuing stimulus to ethnic conflicts in the region, and vice- 
versa. The intensity of the "land problem" in East Sumatra during the early 1950s 
was directly responsible for the fall of at least one cabinet.113 14 In 1953, an Organi­
zation for the Struggle of the Guardians of the Land in Indonesia (Badan Perjuang- 
an Rakyat Penunggu Indonesia--BPRPI) was formed by a group of Malay, Karo, and 
Simalungun community leaders to reassert the special rights of the orang asli to 
plantation lands in East Sumatra.lllt In 1972, the BPRPI organized several attempts 
to cultivate "adat" land unilaterally, resulting in clashes with police, local authori­
ties, and non-Malay farmers, and the arrest of BPRPI leaders.115 In June 1980, 
the "land problem" surfaced once again as regional government authorities and sup­
porters of the BPRPI clashed over rights to land now controlled by state tobacco 
plantations.116 The issue of special orang asli customary rights remains far from 
settled. And although the kerajaan are now a long-dead cause, ethnic and "cul­
tural" interests with which the kerajaan were once intertwined continue to be 
vigorously pursued.
Timur--KRST) was formed to press for the political separation of East Sumatra from 
Tapanuli and the establishment of an East Sumatran province. By mid-1957, a more 
militant extension of the KRST had been formed. Though it represented the same 
interests as the KRST, the new organization, calling itself the Body Demanding 
East Sumatran Autonomy (Badan Penuntut Otonomi Sumatera Timur--Bapost) , 
pressed its case much more militantly. The Bapost leadership included people 
from both the top echelons of the KRST and the old NST. Financial support was 
alleged to have come from Dutch commercial interests and from the Sultan of Deli.
On KRST and Bapost, see Smail, "Military," pp. 165-70; and R. W. Liddle, Eth­
nicity j Party and National Integration: An Indonesian Case Study (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1970), pp. 189-96.
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He had been at the forefront of campaigns in the 1940s to evict non-Malays from 
what were considered Malay adat lands.
115. See reports in Sinar Indonesia Baru (Medan), August 9 and 16, 1972; Was­
pada, August 12, 1972; and Mingguan Mimbar Umum (Medan), August 13, 1972.
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